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DavidSplinter.com


Income Mobility of the Top One Percent (summary)

January 2026 (pdf version)

The standard narrative on inequality is well-known: the top 1% are pulling away from the rest. A revised narrative shows smaller increases in market income inequality, and much less increase for incomes after taxes and transfers, due to increasing tax progressivity and transfers (Auten and Splinter 2024; Burkhauser et al. 2024).

Still, both the standard and revised narratives rely on "snapshot" data — cross-sections that only see incomes in a single year. But what if we instead consider incomes over time?

In Splinter and Larrimore (2025), we use tax data to track the same people over time. The findings challenge the view of a static elite.

Top 1% Mobility is High

The headline finding is how unstable are top incomes. We find that one-third of people in the top 1% fall out after just one year. Over more years, turnover is higher. After a decade, two-thirds of those who started in the top 1% are no longer there.

Exit rates are even higher for the very rich. For the top 0.1%, three-quarters are gone after a decade. For the top 0.001%, four-fifths fall out of that highest group. These estimates support Pareto's old idea of the "circulation of elites."

This high degree of mobility distinguishes the U.S. from other countries. Annual top 1% exit rates in the U.S. of up to 40% (Auten, Gee, and Turner 2013) are higher than in Germany (23%), the UK (26%), Australia (27%), or Canada (30%). The American rich are richer, but they are also less stable in their position.

Where do individuals falling out of the top 1% end up? Among those in the top 1% in 2005, about one-third fall to the bottom 90% ten years later, as seen in the figure.

Top 1% Exit Destinations

Notes: Fiscal income including capital gains, indexed with the PCE. Source: Splinter and Larrimore (2025).

Multi-Year Inequality is Lower than Annual Inequality

Because people cycle in and out of the top, annual measures of inequality overstate longer-run inequality. When averaging income over multiple years, top income share fall. For example, averaging over two decades decreases top-one-percent shares by more than 10%.

The effect is larger as one moves up the distribution:
● The top 0.1% share decreases by about 20%
● The top 0.01% share decreases by about 30%
● The top 0.001% share decreases by about 40%

This implies that part of what we measure as "inequality" is actually "income variability." An owner sells a firm, a worker exercises options, or an investor realizes large capital gains. Their income spikes for a year — pushing them into the top 1% or even top 0.001% — but then recedes. This also affects inequality trends. Over the last quarter century, about one-fifth of the growth in the top 1% share is due to variability.

It's Entrepreneurs, not Rentiers

Who cycles in and out of the top? The data suggest they are not the idle rich living off stable dividends. Decomposing the sources of income variability, we find that most of the increase in top 1% income variability originates from entrepreneurial income. This is driven by "passthrough" businesses such as S-corporations and partnerships.

Unlike Piketty's account of European rentiers in past centuries, today's top U.S. earners are often business owners with volatile incomes. Variability in capital income (dividends and interest) has declined, partially offsetting the larger swings in entrepreneurial income.

What about Wealth?

You might argue that income is volatile, but wealth is persistent. We tackle this by capitalizing income flows to estimate wealth shares, extending the approach used in Saez and Zucman (2016) and Smith et al. (2023) by using panel data. This shows that variability also matters for estimating wealth.

Compared to annual measures, averaging capital incomes over two decades lowers the top 1% wealth share by about 3 percentage points.

This is a smaller relative reduction than for income — about a 9% decrease in the top wealth share — but it suggests that even wealth concentration is somewhat overstated by standard annual measures.

Implications

Fairness
A society where the top 1% consists of the same individuals every year is fundamentally different from one where many cycle through. The high U.S. churn rate suggests that while the top 1% threshold is high relative to other countries, the degree of mobility is also higher.

Hirschl and Rank (2015) estimate that 11% of working-age adults spend at least one year in the top 1% and over half spend at least one year in the top 10%. This circulation is even more pronounced at the very top of the distribution. The median tenure in the top 400 was only a single year (IRS 2016).

Multi-Year Measures
This paper reinforces that annual data can present a biased view of longer-run inequality measures. This is not just an issue for the top, but also the bottom of the distribution, where increased income variability can explain a large share of the growth in overall inequality (Splinter 2022). And, as we found in earlier work, (Larrimore, Mortenson, and Splinter 2022), over 40% of those in poverty in a given year rise out of poverty the next year.

Inequality Levels and Trends
Mobility matters for interpreting both income inequality levels and trends. Variability reduces top 1% shares by over one-tenth and explains one-fifth of its recent increase.

Bottom line

The top one percent is an ever-changing group, with people cycling in and out each year. The rich are different from you and me — their incomes are much more volatile. The top 1% is, in Schumpeter's famous phrase, a hotel that is "always full, but always of different people."

Read the full paper here (pdf).


References

  • Auten, Gerald, Geoffrey Gee, and Nicholas Turner. 2013. New Perspectives on Income Mobility and Inequality. National Tax Journal 66 (4): 893-912.
  • Auten, Gerald, and David Splinter. 2024. Income Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-term Trends. Journal of Political Economy 132 (7): 2179-2227.
  • Burkhauser, R. V., Corinth, K., Elwell, J., & Larrimore, J. 2024. Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure. Journal of Political Economy 132 (1): 1-47.
  • Hirschl, Thomas A., and Mark R. Rank. 2015. The Life Course Dynamics of Affluence. PLoS ONE 10(1): e0116370.
  • IRS. 2016. The 400 Individual Income Tax Returns Reporting the Largest Adjusted Gross Incomes Each Year, 1992-2014. IRS Statistics of Income.
  • Larrimore, Jeff, Jacob Mortenson, and David Splinter, 2022. Presence and Persistence of Poverty in U.S. Tax Data. In Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Janet C. Gornick, Barry Johnson, and Arthur Kennickell (eds.), Measuring Distribution and Mobility of Income and Wealth. Cambridge, MA: NBER. 383-410.
  • Saez, Emmanuel, and Gabriel Zucman. 2016. Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data. Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (2): 519-578.
  • Smith, Matthew, Owen Zidar, and Eric Zwick. 2023. Top Wealth in the United States: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich. Quarterly Journal of Economics 138(1): 515-573.
  • Splinter, David. 2022. Income Mobility and Inequality: Adult-Level Measures from the U.S. Tax Data since 1979. Review of Income and Wealth 68 (4): 906-921.
  • Splinter, David, and Jeff Larrimore. 2025. Income Mobility of the Top One Percent.